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TWO NEW TOOLS FOR ADDRESSING ACTIVIST
HEDGE FUNDS—SUNLIGHT BYLAWS AND
RECIPROCAL DISCLOSURES
Grace Lee Mead*
ABSTRACT
Publicly-traded companies have the power to pass sunlight bylaws to
address hedge fund activism. Sunlight bylaws would require activist
hedge funds to publicly disclose any strategic proposals and their
financial interests in companies earlier and at thresholds lower than
current securities laws. Sunlight bylaws would also require
disclosure of additional information, including: (1) the percentage of
the fund’s portfolio invested in the company; (2) the fund manager’s
compensation; (3) the fund manager’s investment in the fund; (4) the
fund’s portfolio turnover; and (5) the fund’s prior holding periods
after any announcements of an ownership interest and a strategic
proposal. Academic proponents of hedge fund activism defend
activism based on the theory that activist hedge fund managers are
systematically better agents for long-term stockholders than the
incumbent board and executive management. These proponents
argue that fund managers have large stakes in their funds, the funds’
profitability is highly contingent on the financial performance of its
investments, and the funds hold relatively few concentrated
investments. Sunlight bylaws would target factual information
essential to that claim and require its disclosure in succinct,
summary form. Sunlight bylaws would also state that if a
stockholder violates them, that stockholder cannot nominate a
* Ms. Mead is a shareholder at Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson,
P.A. and thanks the following individuals for helpful comments on earlier drafts: Marc
Wolinsky, Martin Lipton, John Huber, Guhan Subramanian, Eugene Stearns, David
Marcus, Garrett Moritz, Andrea Nathan, and Anthony Casey. Rachel Purcell provided
valuable research assistance. The author is a member of the Florida bar and a member
of the New York bar but not a member of the Delaware bar. All views and any errors
are the author’s.
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candidate for a seat on the board or propose any issue for the next
stockholders’ vote.
But institutional investors and proxy advisory firms support hedge
fund activism in the abstract, and a board that passed a sunlight
bylaw might precipitate litigation or a proxy fight. Public companies
should therefore, on a case-by-case basis, request the same or similar
information when an activist that has held shares for a brief period of
time makes a strategic proposal. Public companies should negotiate
confidential treatment of any disclosures for a period of time so that
the activist can reap the full benefit of the short-term increase in
share price after the disclosure of its investment and strategic
proposal some academics and institutional investors think necessary
to incent activism. But public companies should also make very
clear that they reserve the right to publish any questions that the
activist refuses to answer or for which it insists on confidential
treatment. And the other stockholders, who likely invest over longer
timeframes, should carefully consider any information that the
activist discloses—or, equally importantly—refuses to disclose.
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INTRODUCTION
Activist hedge funds have repeatedly invested in public companies,
successfully pushed for the adoption of their strategic proposals, and
then exited within one or two years. Companies can enact sunlight
bylaws, which would require such funds to disclose online any such
proposal within one day and to disclose any direct and indirect financial
interest in the company above 5%. Other information bearing on the
fund’s incentives, such as the fund manager’s compensation, the fund
and fund manager’s compensation based on performance and the
amount of money managed, the percentage of the fund’s assets the
investment represents, and the fund’s portfolio turnover, would also be
disclosed. If an activist hedge fund violated the sunlight bylaw, its
strategic proposal or director nominee could not be proposed for a
stockholder vote without board approval.
But support from a public company’s institutional stockholders for
a sunlight bylaw may often be lacking, and a sunlight bylaw may
precipitate litigation or a proxy fight. Thus, public companies should
begin, as a first step, by requesting that any activist making a strategic
proposal also make voluntary, reciprocal disclosures in response to the
same questions posed by sunlight bylaws. The public company could
make the activist’s disclosures confidential for a period of time. That
would enable the activist to realize the entire short-term gain caused by
its disclosure of a strategic proposal and investment and should not
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reduce an activist’s short-term profits. The public company, in its
request for reciprocal disclosure, should also make clear that it can
publish to stockholders any questions the activist refuses to answer, any
questions that it has agreed to answer only confidentially, the terms of
any negotiated confidentiality agreement, and the activist’s refusal to
update answers.
Part I of this Article outlines the debate over activist hedge funds.1
An activist hedge fund typically identifies a target company it deems
ripe for intervention, buys shares in the open market, and then publicly
announces its beneficial ownership and a strategic proposal by making a
filing under the securities laws. 2 Research has shown about a 5%
increase in the company’s share price in the twenty days up to and
including the activist’s disclosure, followed by about a 2% increase in
share price in the next twenty days. 3 Lead activists frequently
communicate with other hedge funds while acquiring a financial interest
in the company, and those other funds acquire their own interests and
support the lead activist’s strategic proposal. 4 Hedge funds acting
collectively have been dubbed “wolf packs.”
Proponents of activist hedge funds claim that hedge fund managers
have strong incentives to boost short-term share price and systematically
make proposals that increase both net present value and long-term value.
They assert that hedge fund managers’ compensation depends highly on
performance, hedge funds hold few concentrated investments, and hedge
funds use derivatives and other financial instruments to amplify their
investments. They assume that the hedge fund managers’ incentives are
systematically stronger than the company’s executive management and
directors’ incentives to increase share price.
In response, many with enormous practical experience, such as
Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine, corporate lawyer
Martin Lipton, and Blackrock Chairman and CEO Laurence Fink, point
to activist hedge funds’ short average holding periods of one or two
years in the company’s stock and high portfolio turnover to argue that
hedge funds’ focus on short-term returns can harm long-term value. 5
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

See infra Part I.
See infra Parts I, V.A.
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.B.
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They claim that activists often force cuts in long-term investments like
research and development in favor of financial engineering that boosts
share price in the short-term to the detriment of net present value and
long-term value.6
Empirical studies accepted for publication about activists’
intervention and long-term value conducted by those who defend hedge
fund activism have shown that over the five years following activist
hedge fund interventions firm value sometimes increases and sometimes
decreases.7 Other studies have shown that activist interventions decrease
research and development spending and long-term return on assets.8
Part II describes the debate surrounding activists’ current disclosure
obligations under the federal securities laws. 9 Section 13(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) requires activists
to publicly report any strategic proposals ten days after acquiring over a
5% beneficial ownership of a company’s outstanding shares, but does
not count derivatives or short positions toward that threshold.10 Activists
have increased their ownership up to as much as 27% in the ten days
between hitting the reporting threshold and the disclosure deadline. In
part because activists in modern financial markets can increase their
stake so quickly, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz petitioned the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) to require
large stockholders to report any strategic proposals a day after acquiring
a financial interest above 5%, counting derivative ownership structures
and short positions.11 The SEC has yet to act on that petition.
But since that petition was filed, the disclosure issues have become
more acute. Activists now frequently coordinate in wolf packs where
each member owns a smaller stake. Thus, many members of the wolf
pack never reach the Section 13(d) disclosure threshold and never need
to disclose their net economic positions in the company’s stock. They
could even take undisclosed net short positions.12 And although public
companies must disclose material information about their decision6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part II.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2015).
See infra Part II.
See infra Parts I.C, II.
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makers’ compensation and interests in the stock, hedge funds have no
parallel disclosure requirements. Directors and other stockholders can
only guess at any hedge fund’s investment as a percentage of its
portfolio, portfolio turnover, prior holding periods, fund managers’
compensation, and the ownership interests held by a wolf pack based on
spotty public reporting. Thus, the activist defenders’ assertions about
hedge fund managers’ incentives cannot be tested, and the facts bearing
on those incentives are unknown and unknowable in any activist
campaign.
Part III outlines the structure of the proposed sunlight bylaws.
Sunlight bylaws would accelerate hedge funds’ disclosure obligations
consistent with the Wachtell Lipton petition. They would also expand
the scope of disclosure beyond what Section 13(d) and its implementing
rules require. Critical additional disclosures, spelled out below, include:
(1) those parties to which the fund has communicated non-public
information about a prospective strategic proposal and that have agreed
to trade, traded, or agreed to continue to hold a financial interest in the
company’s securities; (2) the fund’s ownership interest in the company
as a percentage of the fund’s overall portfolio; (3) the fund manager’s
compensation; (4) the fund manager’s investment in the fund; (5) the
turnover in the fund’s portfolio; and (6) the fund’s prior holding periods
after any announcements of a financial interest and a strategic
proposal.13 All requirements would also apply to all wolf pack members,
even if they do not individually reach the reporting threshold. Such
disclosures would allow a company’s board and the other stockholders
to make better and more informed decisions in light of the hedge fund’s
incentives.
A sunlight bylaw would also state that unless the activist complies
with it, the activist’s strategic proposal or nominee for the board cannot
be considered at a stockholder vote absent board approval. Public
companies will be able to detect any non-compliance. The lead activist
must first publicly announce its strategic proposal before a stockholder
vote to persuade other stockholders to vote for it, which lead activists
currently do by filing a Schedule 13D under Section 13(d). 14 If the
activist reached the ownership threshold for reporting without disclosing
13.
14.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Parts I, V.A.
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under the sunlight bylaw it would be proof positive of a violation. There
would then be no vote on that proposal or nominee absent board
approval. Part III also explores how sunlight bylaws would reveal
critical facts bearing on the hedge funds’ incentives and the possibility
that they would incent better activism.
Part IV explains that sunlight bylaws should withstand any facial
challenge because Delaware law authorizes their passage. 15 Delaware
General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) section 109(b) authorizes them
because they “relate to” the “rights” and “powers” of stockholders. 16
Consistent with Delaware Supreme Court precedent, they are processoriented and agnostic to the substance of any strategic proposal or
identity of any board nominee.
Nor could a challenger meet its burden of showing the sunlight
bylaw would be inequitable in all circumstances. Requiring enhanced
disclosure is consistent with directors’ fiduciary duties.17 According to
some recent Delaware court decisions, directors have a fiduciary duty to
enhance long-term value. 18 Directors certainly must consider the
implications of strategic proposals for the net present value of the
company, which requires considering a strategic proposal’s implications
for more than the hedge funds’ generally short holding periods. In fact,
Chief Justice Strine has pointed out that enhanced disclosures are important
to the stockholder’s franchise because the hedge fund’s financial interests
are critically important to evaluating its proposals. 19 That task is made
much more difficult while the activist hedge funds proposing them
remain a black box.
Part V explains that sunlight bylaws would also generally be lawful
as applied, although much would depend on the particular facts. 20
Sunlight bylaws enhance the stockholder franchise, promote better
decision-making by boards, cannot be shown to materially reduce
beneficial activism, and may incent better activism. 21 In addition, the
burden on the activist and other stockholders is minimal: the disclosures
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Parts IV.A-B.
See infra Parts IV.A-C.
See infra Parts IV.D, V.B.
See infra Parts IV.D, V.B.
Infra Part V.B.4.
Infra Part V.
Infra Parts III.B-C, IV.D, V.B.4.
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are based on information the activists have readily available; compliance
permits the activists to avoid any delayed vote on its proposal; and if the
disclosure is slightly belated or incomplete, the board can demand any
necessary amendments and exercise its discretion to put the proposal up
for a stockholder vote.
To analyze a sunlight bylaw as applied, Part V considers what a
sunlight bylaw would have revealed and whether it would have been
upheld in the activist hedge fund Trian’s proxy fight against DuPont’s
board.22 In that campaign, Trian adopted the common tactic of attacking
executive compensation relative to performance at DuPont. 23 But one
can compare DuPont’s publicly-reported share price and its then Chair
and CEO Ellen Kullman’s compensation to what Forbes has reported
for Trian and its principal, Nelson Peltz. In 2013 and 2014, DuPont
performed better than Trian, but Kullman averaged about $12.3 million
in total compensation while Peltz averaged over twenty-four times her
compensation—$300 million. 24 Back-of-the envelope math based on
the little publicly-available information suggests that Trian had a
guaranteed income from management fees of about $226 million in
2014.25 DuPont’s directors and executive management, the market, and
other stockholders were entitled to consider more precise and reliable
disclosures regarding Trian when evaluating whether it better
represented the interests of other stockholders than DuPont’s directors
and executive management.
Part VI explores the idea of, in particular activist campaigns,
requesting reciprocal disclosures from activists that would reveal much
of the same information as sunlight bylaws.26 Institutional investors and
proxy advisory firms have generally embraced the notion that activist
hedge funds serve as a useful counter-weight to incumbent boards and
executive management, and many could therefore oppose a proposed
sunlight bylaw. A board may not believe that its stockholders would
support a sunlight bylaw or may believe that it would precipitate
wasteful litigation or a proxy fight. If so, when that board is confronted
with a strategic proposal by an activist hedge fund, it should informally
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part V.
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request that the fund provide the equivalent information in reciprocal
disclosures and, if requested and lawful, agree to give that information
confidential treatment for a period of time.
The directors and executive management should also reserve the
right to publish the questions that the activist refuses to answer or for
which it requests confidential treatment. This would provide
institutional investors and the proxy advisory firms with fodder for
follow-up questions. Recent research shows that activist hedge funds
that intervene by taking a larger stake in the company generate higher
abnormal returns, and perhaps rightly so. But rather than guessing at the
hedge fund’s stake or incentives based on incomplete public disclosures
and news reports, the board and institutional stockholders should
demand that the activist hedge fund disclose the information in a
succinct, summary form. If the activist hedge fund’s incentives truly are
better aligned with other stockholders than the directors and executive
management, it should be happy to oblige. If not, that tells the other
stockholders something too.27
I. THE DEBATE OVER ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS
Both sides of the debate on hedge fund activism agree that it has
risen sharply, with influence on major companies ranging from Apple to
Proctor & Gamble to Whole Foods to DuPont. 28 Much ink has been
spilled debating whether hedge fund activism helps or harms other
stockholders, so only the outlines are sketched here.
27. The term “sunlight” comes from Justice Louis Brandeis’ observation that
“[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman.” LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT
92 (1914). Other People’s Money—a screed against the entire banking and investment
banking industry—influenced many of the securities law reforms of the 1930s. While
the author does not endorse all of Justice Brandeis’s views, fundamentally, if equity
markets are to operate in the sunlight, then all of those seeking to change a public
company’s strategy can reasonably be required to do so.
28. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge
Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1087 (2015); Martin Lipton, Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 6, 2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/11/06/d
ealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-3/ [http://perma.cc/EJ4R-W99Q].
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A. INCREASES IN SHARE PRICE SURROUNDING ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS’
DISCLOSURES
Professor Alon Brav and his co-authors published an early study in
the Journal of Finance showing that activist hedge funds’ securities
filings under Section 13(d) were surrounded by an abnormal share price
return of about 7% without reversal during the subsequent year.29 They
compiled their data from Schedule 13D filings under Section 13(d) and
internet searches, and cross-checked them against hedge funds’
quarterly Schedule 13F filings, 30 which do not require disclosure of
many indirect interests and often receive confidential treatment.31
Their results, since replicated, showed:

Graph 1. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return Around the Filing of
Schedule 13Ds32

29. Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FINANCE 1729 (2008).
30. Id. at 1736-38.
31. Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 864, 871-72 (2006); George
O. Aragon, Michael Hertzel & Zhen Shi, Why Do Hedge Funds Avoid Disclosure?
Evidence from Confidential 13F Filings, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, June 2012,
at 6-7.
32. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 29, at 1756.
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Most of the increase in share price—all but 2%—occurs in the
period before and on the date of the Schedule 13D filing. Professor Brav
and his co-authors theorized that the price increase reflected the
soundness of the strategic proposals based on hedge funds’ superior
incentives to enhance value because “[h]edge funds employ highly
incentivized managers,” “can hold highly concentrated positions in
small numbers of companies,” and “use leverage and derivatives to
extend their reach.”33
They also noted a spike in abnormal trading volume before the
filing.34 They speculated that this might be related to either tipping by
the filer or coordination among activists acting together, but admitted
that “[g]iven the informal and secretive nature of such communication,
our data do[es] not allow for a formal testing of these two
explanations.”35 They also found that, in the following year, companies
showed improved return on assets and operating profit margins.36 They
reported a median holding period of about one year, calculated from the
filing date of the Schedule 13D to its amendment to reflect that the fund
no longer held a significant stake.37
Momentarily lost in the ensuing debate was the disclosure
asymmetry. On one hand, publicly-traded companies must disclose all
material information about their assets, share repurchases, dividends,
executive management’s compensation and interests in the stock, and
directors’ compensation and interests in the stock. For decades,
academics have used these detailed and highly regulated disclosures in
order to craft studies about potential agency issues. In specific
campaigns, the disclosures can give activists information about facts
bearing on the incentives of the company’s decision-makers with which
to attempt to sway the market and other stockholders.
On the other hand, not all activist hedge funds need even disclose
their net economic position in the company. Those shy of the Section
13(d) reporting threshold could take a net short position and
simultaneously encourage others to vote for a strategic proposal that
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 1730.
Id. at 1756.
Id. at 1757.
Id. at 1770-71.
Id. at 1731, 1765.
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they believe will tank the stock a few years after adoption. And activists
need not disclose the investment as a percentage of their portfolio, or
disclose any other information about their portfolio turnover, their
investment horizons, or their decision-makers’ compensation or other
incentives, although limited information can be gleaned from Section
13F filings, news reports, and the Internet. 38 This distorted disclosure
landscape means that activist hedge funds and their defenders can
always articulate some agency issue at least theoretically faced by the
directors or executive management, but neither the board nor other
stockholders can evaluate the facts bearing on the activist hedge funds’
incentives. On this uneven playing field, activists drive up short-run
share prices and win stockholder votes.
And, of course, scholars like Professor Robert Shiller believe that
short-term stock price movements often reflect speculation, fads, and
overreactions driven by psychological factors, 39 which may cause an
increase in share price after an activist files a Schedule 13D. In 2014,
back-of-the-envelope math suggests that the top twenty-five hedge fund
managers earned over $11 billion collectively, while only half of the top
ten funds recorded returns that exceeded that of the S&P 500.40 In 2015,
preliminary reports indicated that the average hedge fund outperformed
the S&P 500’s decline of 0.75% for the first time in seven years, but the
average fund only gained 0.03%.41 Reports published in 2016 described
2015 as “an annus horribilis for many big hedge funds” and cited losses

38.
39.

Hu & Black, supra note 31, at 864, 871-72.
ECON. SCI. PRIZE COMM. OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACAD. OF SCI., SCIENTIFIC
BACKGROUND ON THE SVERIGES RIKSBANK PRIZE IN ECONOMIC SCIENCES IN MEMORY
OF ALFRED NOBEL 2013: UNDERSTANDING ASSET PRICES 30-35 (2013) [hereinafter
UNDERSTANDING ASSET PRICES], http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economicsciences/laureates/2013/advanced-economicsciences2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/R53S-6K
KK].
40. Alexandra Stevenson, For Top 25 Hedge Fund Managers, a Difficult 2014 Still
Paid Well, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/0
5/business/dealbook/top-25-hedge-fund-managers-took-bad-14-all-the-way-to-the-bank
.html? ref=dealbook [http://perma.cc/HM67-W8YU].
41. Alexandra Stevenson & Matthew Goldstein, Battered, Apologetic and Still
Pitching Their Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.nyti
mes.com/2015/12/16/business/dealbook/battered-apologetic-and-still-pitching-their-hed
ge-funds.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/5Q3D-GY4L].

2016]

TWO NEW TOOLS FOR
ADDRESSING ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS

491

from large funds ranging from about 5% to 20%.42 Perhaps hedge funds
have built an undeserved reputation for financial acumen; indeed, it
appears that investors poured more than $18 billion into hedge funds in
2014 despite high fees and a poor average performance. 43 That could
also drive the short-term increase in share price.
B. THE DEBATE OVER SHORT-TERMISM
Activist hedge funds’ interventions and early empirical work
quickly elicited a short-termism argument from those with more
practical experience. 44 The short-termism criticism ran: (1) activist
investors have short investment horizons; 45 (2) activist hedge funds’
“real goal is a short-term bump in the stock price,” because “[t]hey
lobby publicly for significant structural changes, hoping to drive up the
share price and book quick profits,” and “[t]hen they bail out, leaving
corporate management to clean up the mess;”46 and (3) activist hedge
funds often push for cuts in long-term “research and development
expenses, capital expenditures, market development, and new business
ventures, simply because they promise to pay off only in the long-term”

42. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Activist Investors May Have Met Their Match: A
Down Market, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
01/27/business/dealbook/activist-investors-may-have-met-their-match-a-down-market.h
tml [http://perma.cc/BSX3-96U9].
43. Carl Richards, A Mystery in Hedge Fund Investing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/09/your-money/a-mystery-in-hedge-fund-investing.ht
ml [http://perma.cc/P45Q-Q6RK].
44. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Further Recognition
of the Adverse Effects of Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/Att
orneyPubs/WLRK.23902.15.pdf [http://perma.cc/CT5J-WWQ9]; Letter from Laurence
D. Fink, Chairman and CEO, Blackrock, to Shareholders (Mar. 31, 2015),
http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/literature/publication/long-term-value-letter
-041415.pdf [http://perma.cc/MFH8-6D9D].
45. Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 28, at 1093-94.
46. Id. at 1094 (quoting Bill George, Activists Seek Short-Term Gain, Not LongTerm Value, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 26, 2013, 10:56 AM), http://dealbook.nytim
es.com/2013/08/26/activists-seek-short-term-gain-not-long-term-value/?_r=0 [http://per
ma.cc/9ZZ4-Z4N3]).
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for mergers, spin-offs, share repurchases, or dividends that increase
share prices in the short-term.47
In industries that require making enormous capital outlays based on
confidential information about the potential yield of research and
development programs, like pharmaceuticals, the directors and
executive management must decide issues with impacts that can span
decades. Professor Lucian Bebchuk and one of his co-authors have
acknowledged the market’s focus on short-term returns can mean that
“[u]nderinvestment will occur when the market has incomplete
information about the level of investment undertaken,” as is the case for
“investments which must be kept secret from competitors such as new
product designs and developments.” 48 Making such long-term
investments may also create enormous social value. Cutting those
outlays and foregoing their long-term value to increase earnings, pay a
portion in dividends, or spin-off a portion of the company may bump up
stock price or operating performance for as long as five years, while
harming the company’s stockholders and society over a twenty-year
period.49
Professor Bebchuk responded by explaining why activists may
sometimes promote long-term value. Professor Bebchuk theorized that
the premises of those critical of short-termism do not rule out activists
seeking actions that increase long-term value. Activists would have
incentives to do so “when the action’s effect on short-term value is
expected to at least partly reflect its positive effect on long-term value,”

47. Id. (quoting Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of
Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
187, 210 (1991)).
48. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Lars A. Stole, Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to
Under- or Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects?, 48 J. FINANCE 719, 726 (1993).
49. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge
Fund Activism on Corporate Governance 49-51, 82-85 (Columbia Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 521, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2656325 [http://perma.cc/4TK
F-K7KN]; Martijn Cremers, Erasmo Giambona, Simone M. Sepe & Ye Wang, Hedge
Fund Activism and Long-Term Value 3-4, 13-14, 24-28 (Nov. 19, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693231 [http://perma
.cc/SYJ4-JKD4].
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and “it is plausible for short-term and long-term changes in value to be
at least positively correlated.”50
Revisiting the finance research on the efficient capital markets
hypothesis yields an additional important insight: hedge funds have no
unique ability to understand the market as a class of investors. Since
Professor Eugene Fama published his seminal paper on the efficient
capital markets hypothesis in 1970, “[a] remarkably large body of
evidence suggests that professional investment managers are not able to
outperform index funds that buy and hold the broad stock market
portfolio.”51 Indeed, Warren Buffett is handily winning his bet with a
New York hedge fund manager that the hedge fund would underperform
Buffett’s investment in an S&P index fund over a ten-year period: by
early 2014, the hedge fund had underperformed by about 30%.52
Professor Bebchuk has argued that opponents of activism assume
market inefficiencies because they also assume that short-term share
price increases do not reflect long-term consequences,53 but his theory is
incompatible with an efficient market that rapidly incorporates all
publicly-available information. He argues that activist hedge funds
target underperforming and presumably undervalued companies and
know why they are undervalued.54 But the activist hedge funds’ ability,
as a class of investors, to target those firms is called into doubt by the
general tenets of the efficient capital markets hypothesis and the
reporting on the returns of hedge funds. Hedge funds cannot identify
undervalued companies with recently enacted business and governance
changes that are likely to perform better than the market generally, so it

50. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term
Shareholder Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1663 (2013).
51. Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON.
PERSP. 59, 77 (2003).
52. See Mitch Tuchum, Warren Buffet on Track to Win Hedge Fund Bet,
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 4, 2014, 5:51 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/warrenbuffett-on-track-to-win-hedge-fund-bet-2014-12-04 [http://perma.cc/SE32-P5VZ]; see
also Carl Richards, A Mystery in Hedge Fund Investing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/09/your-money/a-mystery-in-hedge-fund-investing.ht
ml?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/T9K2-K756] (reporting on ten years of Vanguard data
showing that index funds outperformed hedge funds).
53. Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 28, at 1089.
54. Id. at 1090, 1105-06.
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seems unlikely that they can identify undervalued firms to determine
which are ripe for intervention. On top of that, they then must succeed at
the complex task of picking the right business and governance changes
out of a large range of possibilities to boost long-term operating
performance and share price. A strong version of the efficient capital
markets hypothesis casts doubt on their unique ability to do this.
And notable critics of strong versions of the efficient capital
markets hypothesis would not assume that activist hedge funds can
accurately predict returns based on particular business or governance
changes with an investment horizon of one or two years. Over the last
four decades, “systematic evidence” has developed “that returns on
exchange-traded stocks are somewhat predictable over short horizons,
but that the degree of predictability is so low that hardly any unexploited
trading profits remain, once transaction costs are taken into account.”55
Only over the longer term do investors like Buffett or scholars like
Professor Shiller, who criticize the limits of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis, think it possible to reliably identify undervalued companies
and profit from their return to a valuation that more accurately reflects
the business’s prospects. The most prominent detractors of the efficient
capital markets hypothesis like Professor Shiller claim that metrics such
as book-to-market value can predict stock prices over the course of
business cycles.56
As Professor Shiller put it colloquially in a New York Times
opinion piece: the efficient capital markets hypothesis is a “half-truth.”57
Professor Shiller explains:
If the theory said nothing more than that it is unlikely that the
average amateur investor can get rich quickly by trading in the
markets based on publicly available information, the theory would
be spot on. I personally believe this, and in my own investing I have
58
avoided trading too much.

55.
56.
57.

UNDERSTANDING ASSET PRICES, supra note 39, at 14.
Id. at 42.
Robert J. Shiller, Sharing Nobel Honors, and Agreeing to Disagree, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/business/sharing-nobelhonors-and-agreeing-to-disagree.html [http://perma.cc/5BTG-DT2E].
58. Id. (emphasis added).
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Hardly an amateur, Professor Shiller apparently would not turn
over his portfolio at the up to 300% rate that hedge funds do each year.59
Such a churn is highly unlikely to yield profits in the long term and
makes suspect the claim that such activist hedge funds systematically
and correctly identify targets for intervention to improve long-term
value.
Professors John Coffee and Darius Palia seem to embrace the idea
that activist investing is a way for hedge funds to circumvent the limited
profitability created by efficient equity markets, but they fail to explain
why an activist investor would not first have to pick stocks and make
judgments equally or more difficult than those required in the market to
identify an underperforming target and make strategic proposals to
remedy its underperformance.60 In that same paper, they also conclude
that when looking at three- and five-calendar year returns before and
after the filing of a Schedule 13D, studies find that stock returns are not
statistically significant from zero, using a four-factor model to predict
alternative returns on equity investments elsewhere in the market.61 In
other words, activist interventions do not enable the targeted firms to
beat the market.
Bereft of evidence that hedge funds are better at stock picking,
Professor Bebchuk returned to where Professor Brav began—he relied
on agency arguments to cast the average activist hedge fund manager in
the role of Robin Hood.62 He assumed that hedge fund managers with
access to only publicly-available information and with compensation
that depends on the performance of the fund’s fractional interest in one
of many investments will systematically push for business and
governance decisions that create positive externalities for other investors
after the hedge funds have reaped their profits and exited. He also
assumed that the hedge funds are systematically better positioned and
incentivized to make those decisions than the company’s directors and
executive management, despite the latter’s access to proprietary

59. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction
to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 478
n.87 (2014).
60. Coffee & Palia, supra note 49, at 18.
61. Id. at 69.
62. Bebchuk, supra note 50, at 1663-64.
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information, compensation, and continued employment linked directly
to the performance of that company.63
Fast forward to the present, and now there seems to be agreement
on each side about five general empirical features of hedge fund
activism: (1) the number of activist hedge fund challenges to public
companies has skyrocketed; (2) there is a short-term spike in target
companies’ stock prices surrounding an activist hedge fund’s Schedule
13D filing; (3) an activist hedge fund that acquires shares prior to hitting
the reporting threshold under the securities laws for filing a Schedule
13D stands to gain an immediate profit once the Schedule 13D is filed;
(4) activist hedge funds usually exit within one or two years after the
filing of the Schedule 13D; 64 and (5) hedge funds turn over their
portfolios at around 100% to 300% each year.65
Empirical studies have also focused on the correlation between
activist interventions and agency costs. Professors Coffee and Palia
survey studies of the effect of activist interventions to change corporate
governance and executive compensation and conclude that “most of the
evidence shows that the positive abnormal returns are not statistically
significantly related to” changes in corporate governance or reduction of
excessive managerial compensation.66
Empirical studies have also recently focused on the correlation
between activist interventions and long-term value. Professor Bebchuk,
his co-authors, and others have attempted to support their claims about
activists through empirical studies that lump all activists together, but
any overall increase in long-term stockholder value that follows activist
interventions ranges from nonexistent to tiny. Professors Coffee and Palia
explain that studies have found that it is “unclear that there is any
significant positive long term-price reaction” absent a proposed take-over
or restructuring and it is “doubtful that operating performance improves
after activist interventions.”67 Professor Yvan Allaire and François Dauphin
have pointed out that Professor Bebchuk and his co-authors’ industry-

63. Compare id. (arguing that activists can indeed produce long-term benefits), with
Strine, supra note 59, at 451 (criticizing Bebchuk’s argument).
64. Coffee & Palia, supra note 49, at 36, 80.
65. Strine, supra note 59, at 478 n.87.
66. Coffee & Palia, supra note 49, at 75-76.
67. Id. at 80.
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specific tables in their latest study measuring return on assets show “a
performance infinitesimally smaller than industry performance [in year
one] to a performance infinitesimally better than industry performance” in
year five. 68 Indeed, Professor Bebchuk and his co-authors themselves
describe their study as principally proving a negative; namely, that activist
interventions are not followed by declines on operating performance or
stock price in the ensuing five years.69 These studies reveal that activist
interventions are sometimes followed by positive results and sometimes by
negative results.
Professor Martijin Cremers and his co-authors published a paper
reporting the results of a study that attempts to control for the selection
bias created by hedge funds’ typical tactic of targeting underperforming
companies. 70 They created a matched sample where for each firm
targeted by a hedge fund they assigned a control non-targeted firm with
similar characteristics. They found that hedge fund activist interventions
reduce long-term value at targeted firms over three years by about 9.8%
compared to their control sample of matched underperforming firms.71
And they found that innovative firms decline in value by about 50%
after being targeted. 72 They are currently dueling with defenders of
hedge fund activism over the data.73

68. YVAN ALLAIRE & FRANÇOIS DAUPHIN, INST. FOR GOVERNANCE OF PRIVATE &
PUB. ORGS., “ACTIVIST” HEDGE FUNDS: CREATORS OF LASTING WEALTH? WHAT DO
THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES REALLY SAY? 9 (2014), http://www.wlrk.com/docs/IGOPP_Ar
ticle_Template2014_Activism_EN_v6.pdf [http://perma.cc/T7G6-DRB2].
69. Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 28, at 1089.
70. Cremers, Giambona, Sepe & Wang, supra note 49.
71. Id. at 7, 14-20.
72. Id. at 8, 24-26.
73. E.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch, The LongTerm Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: A Reply to Cremers, Giambona, Sepe, and
Wang, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 10, 2015),
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/10/the-long-term-effects-of-hedge-fund-activis
m-a-reply-to-cremers-giambona-sepe-and-wang/
[http://perma.cc/2HQT-AX6H];
Martin Cremers, Erasmo Giambona, Simone M. Sepe & Ye Wang, Reply, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 19, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard
.edu/2015/12/19/reply/ [http://perma.cc/VP9Q-ND63].
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Professor Allaire and Dauphin have reported the results from a
study that tries to catalogue the different hedge fund interventions. 74
They surveyed nine studies on activist campaigns and noted that their
data sets included widely divergent numbers of campaigns.75 They then
drilled down into the data captured by the Wall Street Journal-FactSet
Activism Scorecard to categorize activist campaigns. 76 Their findings
show that hedge funds adopt the tactic of publicly criticizing the
company in about 28% of cases with about a 59% success rate.77 Their
findings also show that activist hedge fund interventions are followed by
slashing research and development until the third year after the
intervention, by which time most activists have liquidated their
investments, while the median research and development for a random
sample of firms increased substantially. 78 They found slight
improvements on return on assets, but most of those improvements were
driven by financial engineering in the form of selling assets,
repurchasing shares, or cutting investments. 79 They also found that,
although stock price tends to increase slightly compared to a random
sample, in many cases it is driven by the sale of targeted firms, spin offs,
or stock repurchases.80
Professors Coffee and Palia explain: “[B]ecause management
generally has better information than outsiders, coupled with a strong
incentive to maximize the firm’s stock price, one can no longer begin
from the premise that investment projects favored by management are
the product of an inefficient preference for ‘empire-building.’”81
Finally, Professors C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy, and Randall
Thomas published a paper reporting that the abnormal returns for hedge
funds that make the largest investments are correlated with higher initial

74. Yvan Allaire & François Dauphin, The Game of ‘Activist’ Hedge Funds: Cui
Bono?, INT’L. J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE, Dec. 2015, at 4-5.
75. Id. at 3-4.
76. Id. at 4-5.
77. Id. at 6-7.
78. Id. at 11.
79. Id. at 8-12.
80. Id. at 24-25.
81. Coffee & Palia, supra note 49, at 84.
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abnormal stock price returns, higher returns on assets, and higher
research and development spending.82
C. THE RISE OF WOLF PACKS
Recently, activist hedge funds have coordinated and acted as “wolf
packs” agitating for corporate changes collectively, but in a way that
does not require classifying them as a “group” for reporting under
Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act.83 These non-groups often buy on the
knowledge, shared among them, that at least one will shortly file a
Schedule 13D that discloses a strategic plan for a potential sale or breakup of the company.84 After all, sales of public companies are usually
accompanied by control premiums, and some finance theory predicts, all
else being equal, that conglomerates in the aggregate trade at a discount
to the sum of the value of their pure play segments. And companies have
often responded to activists’ threats of proxy contests with share
repurchases and dividends.85
Wolf packs raise unique agency and disclosure issues. Because
each member owns a smaller interest individually, the inference that it is
more likely to promote the interests of long-term stockholders than the
company’s executive management and directors seems particularly
strained.
Wolf packs are also more opaque because they can collectively
own more shares before triggering the reporting requirements under
Section 13(d). They also effectively evade the federal securities laws’
requirement that a beneficial owner of above 10% of a company’s stock
automatically forfeit any short-swing profits if it sells within six
82. See, e.g., C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, The Second
Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise
(Vanderbilt Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 15-9, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=25
89992 [http://perma.cc/VGC5-3K4V].
83. Coffee & Palia, supra note 49, at 23-36, 42.
84. Id.; Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, The Threat to
Shareholders and the Economy from Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 14, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/14/t
he-threat-to-shareholders-and-the-economy-from-activist-hedge-funds/ [http://perma.cc
/V7RA-WJCW].
85. Coffee & Palia, supra note 49, at 30.
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months. 86 Therefore, it is probably no coincidence that studies of
Schedule 13D filings show that individual activists’ average ownership
is about 8.3% and wolf packs’ average, collective ownership is about
13.44%. 87 Of course, that latter number may well be a substantial
underestimate because it is unclear that all members of any wolf pack
meet Section 13(d)’s requirements: at least sometimes additional
members likely lurk below its reporting threshold, undisclosed and
uncounted. 88 Members could even take turns in campaigns, at times
serving as a lead agitator and at other times simply as an opportunistic
buyer and seller that could buy shortly before and sell shortly after the
filing of the Schedule 13D for a guaranteed profit. Naturally, this
opacity complicates efforts to study and understand wolf pack behavior.
Some academics have also raised concerns about the undisclosed
decoupling of share ownership from voting rights, which is particularly
acute for wolf pack members.89 Professors Henry Hu and Bernard Black
have explained that by buying shares while simultaneously taking short
positions through swaps and other derivatives, investors can engage in
“empty voting”: the investor can structure its economic interest so that it
holds more votes than shares and may even have an undisclosed net
short position.90 This would “give[] the investor an incentive to vote in
ways that reduce the company’s share price.”91 Given that these shorts
are not disclosed by wolf pack members that never reach the threshold at
which they may have to disclose that information on a Schedule 13D
filing, there is no way to know the extent of this problem.92

86. Credit Suisse Sec. LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1417, 1417 n.1 (2012).
87. John C. Coffee, Jr., The DuPont Proxy Battle: New Myths, Old Realities—And
Even Newer Data About Hedge Fund Activism, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Apr. 20, 2015),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/04/20/the-dupont-proxy-battle-new-myths-old
-realities-and-even-newer-data-about-hedge-fund-activism/ [http://perma.cc/D4CX-KF
YS].
88. Id.
89. See generally Hu & Black, supra note 31.
90. Id. at 812.
91. Id. at 815.
92. Id.
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II. ENHANCING DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 13(D)
The limits of the current knowledge about activist hedge funds,
their collective net economic interests, and their activities below current
reporting thresholds have constrained companies’ ability to evaluate
activist proposals and academics’ ability to research the issue.
In 2011, as a partial remedy, Wachtell Lipton petitioned the SEC to
enact revised rules under Section 13(d) that would require stockholders
to file a Schedule 13D disclosure within one business day rather than ten
after passing the 5% ownership threshold. 93 This would effectively
lower the reporting threshold by counting derivatives and short interests
toward it. 94 Professors Coffee and Palia have suggested that the
proposed rules could be further revised to make any activist that traded
on a shared strategy part of the group.95
Professor Bebchuk and one of his co-authors responded to the
Wachtell Lipton petition with many of the same claims about the value
of activist hedge funds but extended his argument even further. He
added the claim that enhancing disclosure requirements would be so
burdensome that it would deter a material amount of beneficial
activism. 96 In response to the hedge fund’s disclosure, the target
company can enact a rights plan that effectively caps the activist’s
investment. 97 And, regardless of whether a rights plan is enacted,
Professor Bebchuk theorized that the marginal profits hedge funds make
buying an increased stake at a level higher than an amended reporting
threshold but lower than the current reporting threshold are necessary to
incentivize them to benefit long-term stockholders.98 But concerns about
the theoretical possibility that moderate limits on the profitability of
hedge funds’ investments will disincentivize beneficial activism ignore
93. Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec’y, SEC (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2HTM-DZZS].
94. Id.
95. Coffee & Palia, supra note 49, at 94-95.
96. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of
Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 50-51 (2012).
97. Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, Nos. 9469–VCP, 9497–VCP, 9508–VCP, 2014
WL 1922029, at *17-21 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014).
98. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 96, at 50.
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the massive surge in activism recognized by all. There hardly seems to
be a shortage of incentives to engage in it.
Professors Coffee and Palia have identified eight separate legal and
financial changes that have increased activism by hedge funds,
including: (1) the decline of staggered boards so all directors stand for
election at the same time and are more vulnerable to proxy contests; (2)
the rise of proxy advisors due in part to the need for low-cost pensions
and mutual funds to cheaply meet relatively new regulatory standards of
care for voting their shares; and (3) the prohibition against brokers,
which used to routinely vote with management on strategic proposals,
voting shares held in street name for their clients without instructions.99
None of these three changes would be affected by enhanced disclosure
requirements imposed on hedge funds. Because of these many complex
variables contributing to the rise in activism, Professor Bebchuk has
failed to articulate why the reduction in profit-taking caused by
enhanced disclosure would deter a meaningful level of beneficial
activism.
Recent evidence of activism across twenty-three countries also may
show that its level is relatively insensitive to differences in disclosure
and corporate governance regimes. As Wachtell Lipton noted in its
petition, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Hong Kong require
disclosure more quickly after reaching ownership thresholds than the
United States. 100 Professor Marco Becht and his co-authors, however,
have recently reported that activism is also frequent in Europe and Asia,
that it generates short-term abnormal returns comparable to the United
States, and that activists appear to adapt tactics to each country’s
corporate governance and disclosure regime.101 This naturally leads to
the question of what disclosure and governance regime best promotes
beneficial activism, even if it might be one that reduces the overall level
of activism.

99. Coffee & Palia, supra note 49, at 18-46.
100. Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, supra note 93, at 2.
101. Marco Becht, Julian Franks, Jeremy Grant & Hannes Wagner, The Returns to
Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study 2, 12, 13 (European Corp. Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 402/2014, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2376271 [http://per
ma.cc/7H5C-GE6E].
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III. SUNLIGHT BYLAWS WOULD REVEAL NECESSARY INFORMATION
Public companies can pass sunlight bylaws to require what the
outdated rules under Section 13(d) fail to mandate. Those bylaws would
also require activist hedge funds to provide specific facts bearing on the
general claims made by their defenders.
A. OUTLINE OF THE PROPOSED SUNLIGHT BYLAWS
Borrowing heavily from the Wachtell Lipton petition and
Professors Coffee and Palia’s paper, the bylaws would require:
(1) the stockholder to post on the internet an affidavit from its
highest-ranking financial officer within one business day after acquiring
a financial interest above 5% of the outstanding shares of the company
on behalf of itself and those with which it is coordinating for any of the
purposes listed in Item 4 of the regulations governing Schedule 13D
disclosures;102
(2) the term “financial interest” would encompass ownership of any
financial instrument that creates the opportunity, directly or indirectly,
to profit or share in any profit derived from any increase or decrease in
the value of the company’s securities;
(3) the affidavit must separately disclose any indirect interests held
by the stockholder in the company, including short interests, derivatives,
or swap positions;
(4) those parties with which the stockholder is coordinating would
include those that the stockholder shares non-public information about a
prospective strategic proposal, an affidavit to be published as required
by the sunlight bylaw, a Schedule 13D filing, or a proxy campaign and
that have agreed to trade, traded, or agreed to continue to hold a
financial interest in the company’s securities;

102. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2015). This threshold could be adjusted depending
on the market capitalization of the company, and, in fact, might be far too low for a
company like DuPont with a market capitalization of about $68 billion during Trian’s
activist campaign. By the date that Trian filed its definitive proxy there, it owned about
24.5 million shares, only about 2.7% of those outstanding. The Trian Group, Proxy
Statement (Schedule 14A) (Mar. 25, 2015).
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(5) the affidavit must disclose those parties outside the
stockholding institution to which the stockholder has communicated
non-public information about a prospective strategic proposal, an
affidavit to be published as required by the sunlight bylaw, a Schedule
13D filing, or a proxy campaign;
(6) those parties with which the stockholder is coordinating would
have to separately disclose, consistent with the bylaw’s requirements,
within one business day after receiving the shared, non-public
information and agreeing to trade, trading, or agreeing to continue to
hold even if they individually did not pass the 5% threshold;
(7) the affidavit must disclose the stockholder’s investment in the
target company as a percentage of the stockholder’s total investments;
(8) the affidavit must disclose any compensation scheme, any total
actual compensation, actual compensation based on the percentage of
assets under management, actual compensation based on any
performance fee for realized gains, actual compensation based on any
performance fee for unrealized gains, and any investment in or options
for investment in the stockholder for the current year and each of the
past five years for those making decisions about the stockholder’s
investment in the company or any strategic proposals for the company;
(9) the affidavit must separately disclose the stockholder’s return
on investment quarterly for the past five years for all investments, all
publicly-traded equity investments, all investments that the stockholder
has held for at least three years, and all publicly-traded equity
investments that the stockholder has held for at least three years;
(10) the affidavit must disclose the stockholder’s annual portfolio
turnover for each of the past five years for publicly-traded equity
investments and all investments;
(11) the affidavit must disclose the stockholder’s prior Schedule
13D filings or disclosures under sunlight bylaws, any subsequent
material purchases or sales, when it amended its Schedule 13D or
disclosures under the sunlight bylaw to reflect those, and the total length
after filing it held a material number of shares in those companies;
(12) the affidavit must disclose all of the other information required
in a Schedule 13D filing;
(13) the stockholder must email a copy of the affidavit and an
internet link to it to a designated company email address;
(14) if there are any material changes to any of the information
disclosed in the affidavit, the stockholder must amend the filing one
business day after the change, following the same procedures;

2016]

TWO NEW TOOLS FOR
ADDRESSING ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS

505

(15) if a stockholder violates the sunlight bylaw, it would foreclose
the business or nominee supported by the activist from being considered
at a stockholder vote absent board approval; and
(16) any stockholder required to make and that made Section 13G
filings for the prior three calendar years would be exempt from the
requirements of the sunlight bylaw.
More detailed work is necessary to spell out the precise language of
sunlight bylaws, but this Article will assume the above framework to
evaluate their validity and enforceability.
B. SUNLIGHT BYLAW DISCLOSURES WOULD ANSWER KEY QUESTIONS
ABOUT ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS
Besides having all the benefits that Wachtell Lipton’s petition for
rule-making would bring, sunlight bylaws have some unique, additional
advantages. They can answer, in the context that matters most, many of
the factual disputes between activist hedge funds’ proponents and
detractors.
Under any view of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, it is
difficult to understand why activist hedge funds can so improve business
or governance based on publicly-available information. The proponents
of activist hedge funds believe them to be better agents for other
stockholders than the directors and executive management. But rather
than simply continuing to assume, theorize, or study that generalization
based on spotty data, the activist hedge funds should have to disclose the
specific information bearing on it.
As explained, Professors Brav’s and Bebchuk’s theoretical defense
of activism claims it is only beneficial at times, and, at bottom, rests
entirely on the notion that activists are better incentivized than the
company’s executive management and directors.103 And the subsequent
empirical work by defenders of activism shows that lumping activist
hedge funds and their campaigns together reveals mixed results.104 Their

103.
104.

See supra Part I.A-B.
See supra Part I.B.
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work therefore demonstrates that activist hedge funds sometimes harm
net present value and long-term value.105
To be more concrete: Professor Bebchuk has argued that detractors
of activist hedge funds assume their investment horizons are shorter than
they really are.106 But a sunlight bylaw would require each activist hedge
fund to disclose its portfolio turnover and prior holding periods after
publicly announcing its financial interests and strategic proposal. That
tells everyone, directly, the fund’s general approach to holding assets, its
general investment horizon, and when, in the past, it has decided that the
value of its investment has peaked.
Professor Brav and his co-authors have argued that because hedge
funds invest in fewer companies, hedge funds invest more money in
each, and because hedge fund managers take a larger percentage of the
profits, they have stronger incentives to research, monitor, invest, and
intervene.107 Again, rather than theorizing about this possibility, sunlight
bylaws would require disclosure of the activist hedge fund’s direct and
indirect investment in the company as a percentage of its portfolio and
the compensation of the hedge fund’s decision-makers. That would
allow stockholders to compare the incentives of the company’s decisionmakers to those at the activist hedge fund, which is the relevant
comparative agency issue.
C. SUNLIGHT BYLAWS COULD IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF ACTIVIST
PROPOSALS
Sunlight bylaws might also encourage activists to better align their
incentives with other stockholders.
If activist wolf pack members engage in empty voting, by buying
shares and the accompanying voting rights while taking a smaller or
short net economic position, sunlight bylaws would expose that.
Professor Thomas Briggs recognized long before wolf pack activism
reached its current heights, that “[h]edge funds know as well as anyone
else that sunlight is the best disinfectant” and “a competently advised
hedge fund that is truly bent on behavior that might not do well in the
105.
106.
107.

See supra Part I.B.
Bebchuk, supra note 50, at 1660-61.
Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 29, at 2, 7.
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sun is simply not going to purchase enough shares to require a Schedule
13D filing.”108
Forcing comprehensive and systematic disclosure of short
positions, including those taken through swaps and derivatives, would
require wolf pack members lurking below current disclosure thresholds
to evaluate carefully how that disclosure would affect any lead activist’s
ability to sway the institutional stockholders that control the bulk of the
voting power. This type of disclosure might also encourage wolf pack
members to take long positions and think twice before joining a
meritless campaign simply to cash in on the short-term increase in stock
price that surrounds the filing of a Schedule 13D. “[F]or the institutional
shareholders who ultimately decide whether to support an activist’s
proposal, the fact that the activist takes a greater economic stake based
solely on the performance of the stock is a credible signal of a highquality proposal . . . .”109
Activist hedge funds and wolf pack members, which are
sophisticated, savvy, and experienced institutions, would well
understand these dynamics ex ante. 110 Forcing disclosure of these
derivative and potentially short positions might dissuade them from ever
launching campaigns where many members have a close-to-zero or net
short economic interest in the company’s share price. Thus, sunlight
bylaws, even if they reduce the total amount of activism, might increase
the quality of activist proposals.
IV. SUNLIGHT BYLAWS ARE FACIALLY VALID
Activists would likely sue soon after the enactment of a sunlight
bylaw to challenge its facial validity. When companies, including
Federal Express and Chevron, passed forum selection bylaws, a dozen
lawsuits challenging their facial validity were filed in Delaware. 111
108. Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism:
An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 703-04 (2007).
109. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 863, 913 (2013).
110. Coffee & Palia, supra note 49, at 28-32 (describing wolf packs generally).
111. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 938 (Del.
Ch. 2013).
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Activist hedge funds are not bashful, and at least one could sue
immediately after a public company passed a sunlight bylaw.
A. STANDARD FOR DETERMINING FACIAL VALIDITY
A corporation’s bylaws are “presumed to be valid, and the courts
will construe the bylaws in a manner consistent with the law rather than
strike down the bylaws.” 112 “In an unbroken line of decisions dating
back several generations,” the Delaware “Supreme Court has made clear
that the bylaws constitute a binding part of the contract between a
Delaware corporation and its stockholders.”113
Delaware courts have upheld bylaws of Delaware corporations that
require stockholders to vote at a later date,114 sue in specified forums,115
and pay attorneys’ fees if they lose litigation.116 Although recent changes
to the DGCL limit forum selection bylaws and eliminate fee-shifting
bylaws, the cross-section of Delaware lawyers representing the major
constituencies recommending the change recognized that “[t]he DGCL
is broadly enabling and gives wide authority to boards—and
stockholders—to adopt binding bylaw and charter provisions.”117
To be facially valid, a bylaw must be authorized by the DGCL,
must be consistent with the certificate of incorporation, and must not be
otherwise unlawful.118 A party mounting a facial challenge to a bylaw
“must show that the bylaws cannot operate lawfully or equitably under
any circumstances” and “can never operate consistently with the law.”119

112. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 557 (Del. 2014)
(citation and internal quotation omitted).
113. Chevron, 73 A.3d at 955.
114. Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 495-97 (Del. Ch. 1995), aff’d and
remanded, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995).
115. Chevron, 73 A.3d at 939.
116. ATP, 91 A.3d at 558.
117. Francis Pileggi, Delaware Proposes New Fee-Shifting and Forum Selection
Legislation, DEL. CORP. & COMMERCIAL LITIG. BLOG (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.delaw
arelitigation.com/2015/03/articles/commentary/delaware-proposes-new-fee-shifting-and
-forum-selection-legislation/ [http://perma.cc/MZU9-KP3G].
118. ATP, 91 A.3d at 557-58.
119. Chevron, 73 A.3d at 948.
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B. SUNLIGHT BYLAWS ARE AUTHORIZED BY DGCL SECTION 109(B)
1. The Text Authorizes Sunlight Bylaws
DGCL section 109(b)’s plain meaning is dispositive.120 The statute
enables a company to pass otherwise lawful bylaws “relating to . . . the
rights or powers of its stockholders.”121
Dictionaries define “powers” to include any “ability to act or
produce an effect” and “legal authority.” 122 Sunlight bylaws, by
requiring activist hedge funds to make disclosures not required by
current law for their proposals to be considered, limit their “ability to
act,” ability to effect stockholder approval, and authority to put business
to a stockholder vote. Sunlight bylaws thus “relat[e] to” stockholders’
“powers.”
Dictionaries define “rights” to include any “power” or “privilege”
that is “secured to a person by law.”123 Sunlight bylaws delimit the legal
privileges afforded to activist hedge funds to put business to a
stockholder vote without making disclosures and therefore “relat[e] to”
their rights.

120. Angstadt v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist., 4 A.3d 382, 388, 388 n.5, 390 (Del.
2010).
121. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2015).
122. Power,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE
UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/power [http://perma.cc/J9H5-8PXY]; see
also Power, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/1491
67?rskey=oXGRuw&result=1#eid [http://perma.cc/3PM3-NJJR]; Power, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968); 8 THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 669 (Oxford University Press 1961) (1884-1928).
123. Right, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Right, MERRIAMWEBSTER ONLINE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/right [http://perma.cc/AX2L-TTZ4]; Right, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/165853?rskey=96JvHS&result=1&isAdvanced=false#
eid [http://perma.cc/U87V-GSZE]; Right, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968); 7
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1218 (Oxford University Press 1961) (1884-1928).
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2. Sunlight Bylaws Are Process-Oriented
Sunlight bylaws are also authorized by Delaware law because they
set forth rules and procedures that bind a corporation and its
stockholders and dictate no particular outcome.
In CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, the Delaware
Supreme Court found that a stockholder-proposed bylaw that would
have required reimbursement for dissident stockholder proxy contest
expenses was authorized by section 109(b). 124 The company opposing
the proposed bylaw did not even argue that section 109(b)’s broad
language did not authorize it, but instead argued that it contradicted
another provision of the DGCL not relevant here. 125 The court
nonetheless relied on the breadth of authority granted under
section 109(b) and the DGCL more generally to dispose of the
argument. The court explained that “[b]ylaws, by their very nature, set
down rules and procedures that bind a corporation’s board and its
shareholders.” 126 The court noted that “procedural, process-oriented”
bylaws such as those regulating proxy contests are firmly ensconced in
Delaware law, and therefore found that the DGCL authorized the
proposed bylaw. 127 And, although Delaware courts rarely consider
hypotheticals when confronted with facial challenge to bylaws, the
Delaware Supreme Court, in the unique procedural posture of answering
a certified question from the SEC, 128 found the bylaw inequitable
because reimbursement could sometimes violate the incumbent
directors’ fiduciary duties.129
Sunlight bylaws would not be the first time that companies have
followed up on the SEC’s failure to pass effective rules by modifying
and adopting them as bylaws. Mary Schapiro was the SEC Chair when it
issued the shareholder proxy access rule permitting holders of 3% or
more of shares for the past three years to add director nominees to the
company’s proxy, which was vacated by the D.C. Circuit. But she now
sits on the board of General Electric, which has passed a bylaw similar
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008)
Id. at 233-34.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 235-36.
Chevron, 73 A.3d at 949 n.62.
AFSCME Emps., 953 A.2d at 240.
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to that invalidated rule.130 And General Electric’s bylaws also provide
that non-compliance with the procedural requirements for gaining access
to General Electric’s proxy forecloses the business proposed by the
stockholder from being conducted at the stockholder meeting.131
Although sunlight bylaws regulate stockholders at a different stage
of the process, they are procedural, process-oriented bylaws. As part of
the process of acquiring a significant ownership stake in a company and
making a strategic proposal, raising business that could be the subject of
a proxy vote, or seeking to elect a director, stockholders must make
additional disclosures.
C. SUNLIGHT BYLAWS DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF DGCL
SECTION 202
Activists might argue that the sunlight bylaws fall within the scope
of DGCL section 202 and therefore cannot bind non-consenting
stockholders, but they do not. Section 202 governs “restrictions on the
transfer or registration of transfer of a security of a corporation, or on
the amount of the corporation’s securities that may be owned by any
person or group of persons.” 132 But sunlight bylaws do not restrict
transferability or limit ownership: the activist hedge fund can still buy
and sell as many shares as it likes. Sunlight bylaws are therefore quite
different from the examples of restrictions listed in the statute, such as
those that give the company the right of first refusal, obligate the
company to purchase the securities under certain conditions, require the
company’s consent to a sell, obligate the holder to sell to someone else,
or prohibit or restrict the transfer of shares to designated persons. 133
Thus, section 202 does not bar sunlight bylaws.

130. Ted Mann & Joann S. Lublin, GE to Allow Proxy Access for Big Investors,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2015, 6:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ge-amends-bylawsto-allow-proxy-access-for-big-investors-1423698010 [http://perma.cc/NYH4-4VQR].
131. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., BYLAWS 5 art. VII.D (2016).
132. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (2015).
133. Id. § 202(c).
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D. A CHALLENGER COULD NOT SHOW SUNLIGHT BYLAWS WOULD
NEVER OPERATE LAWFULLY
In a facial challenge, an activist could not meet its burden of
showing that sunlight bylaws cannot operate lawfully or equitably under
any circumstance. As explained, sunlight bylaws would enhance the
stockholder franchise, would promote better board decision-making,
cannot be shown to materially reduce beneficial activism, and may
promote better activism.
And sunlight bylaws would not necessarily make an incumbent
board’s view of the proper strategy for the company more persuasive, let
alone entrench the board. If a hedge fund with an investment strategy
akin to Berkshire Hathaway’s, with what Buffett has described as its
preferred holding period of “forever,” publishes an affidavit disclosing
its portfolio turnover and prior holding periods, it could make a longterm stockholder more likely to support the hedge fund. If the hedge
fund manager’s large and long-standing ownership stake in the fund
creates an overall incentive structure that skews toward rewarding longterm performance while the company’s management is heavily
compensated based on salary, it may also be a selling point for the hedge
fund. And, finally, if a fellow stockholder is looking for a short-term
gain, then it may prefer the proposal of a hedge fund with a high
portfolio turnover.
V. A SUNLIGHT BYLAW AND A HYPOTHETICAL AS-APPLIED
CHALLENGE
Legal challenges to sunlight bylaws could also arise in an activist’s
push for a strategic proposal that escalates into litigation between the
activist and the company. Although every case must be judged
individually, sunlight bylaws should pass muster if thoughtfully adopted
and administered.
A. THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST DUPONT
Consider the following facts from the activist hedge fund Trian’s
two-year campaign against DuPont that culminated in a proxy fight. In
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June 2013, Trian contacted DuPont and made strategic proposals,
including breaking up the company into four different segments and
reducing research and development spending.134 On August 14, 2013,
Trian filed a Schedule 13F disclosing beneficial ownership of over 5
million shares or about 0.65% of DuPont’s stock. 135 Over years of
engagement, DuPont spun off a chemicals segment, reduced research
and development spending by about $9 billion, and bought back about
$2 billion in shares, but rejected the more radical break-up.136 In the Fall
of 2014, the negotiations broke down and Trian’s principal Nelson Peltz
demanded that, absent the appointment of Trian nominees to the board
of directors, Trian would launch a proxy fight.137 DuPont refused, and
the fight ensued.138
DuPont defeated the insurgent slate of directors, largely because it
successfully appealed to three index funds—Vanguard Group,
Blackrock Inc., and State Street Corp.—and retail investors.139 DuPont
prevailed despite the recommendations from the two leading proxy
advisors, Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. and Glass Lewis & Co,
in favor of voting in Peltz as a director.140
But the two-year battle was enormously costly, forced the DuPont
board to make moves to increase short-term value such as the spin-off
and a substantial stock buy-back, and whipsawed the market price of a
$68 billion company.141 Indeed, Professors Coffee and Palia conclude
134. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Mar. 23,
2015).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Jacob Bunge & David Benoit, DuPont Defeats Peltz, Trian in Board Fight,
WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/dupont-appears-poised-towin-over-peltz-1431521564 [http://perma.cc/C8XM-SQPW].
140. Id.
141. Jacob Bunge & David Benoit, DuPont Repels Push by Peltz to Join its Board,
WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2015, 8:23 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/dupont-repels-push
-by-peltz-to-join-its-board-1431562720 [http://perma.cc/8SDW-P7JK]; Bill George,
Peltz’s Attack on DuPont Threatens American’s Research Edge, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/10/business/dealbook/pelt
zs-attacks-on-dupont-threaten-americas-research-edge.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/FM8
A-LJHE].
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that “DuPont survived largely intact by preempting Trian’s strategy—
with the result that, whether management wins or loses in the proxy
contest, [research & development] expenditures decline.”142 And Peltz
still lost by only about 8% of the shares voted.143 Since DuPont “won”
that proxy fight, its CEO has resigned “and the new CEO announced
that the company would pursue some of the strategies Trian [] had urged
in the proxy fight.”144 And now, under continuing pressure, DuPont has
proposed a complicated merger with Dow Chemical that will result in a
combined company with over 100,000 employees destined in two years
to be split into three new companies focused on agriculture, material
sciences, and specialty products like nutrition and electronics.145 That is
despite the fact that the last unit DuPont spun off—the chemicals unit
spun off in part as an effort to appease activists—lost three quarters of
its value in less than a year after its separation.146
B. THE DUPONT HYPOTHETICAL

Consider what would have happened if DuPont had passed a
sunlight bylaw, and Trian exceeded its thresholds but flaunted it.
1. Detection of the Activists

In DuPont, Trian first made its strategic proposals in June 2013
and filed a Schedule 13F in August 2013, more than a year-and-ahalf before the stockholder vote. The Schedule 13F filing and other
communications with Trian would have tipped DuPont off.
Assuming it did not already have a sunlight bylaw in place, DuPont

142. Coffee & Palia, supra note 49, at 59.
143. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Current Report (Form 8-K/A) (June 9, 2015).
144. Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Some Thoughts for Boards of
Directors in 2016, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 9,
2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/09/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-director
s-in-2016/ [http://perma.cc/5RRS-RYWB].
145. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Remaking Dow and DuPont for the Activist
Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
12/16/business/dealbook/remaking-dow-and-dupont-for-the-activist-shareholders.html
[http://perma.cc/8ZZ5-LFMV].
146. Id.
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could have enacted one, and Trian would have faced the choice
between complying or refusing to comply and having its strategic
proposal and any director nominees become ineligible for the
stockholder vote. Trian never reached the ownership threshold on its
own that would have triggered an obligation to file a Schedule 13D
or Schedule 13G, so there is a question of whether it would reach the
ownership threshold required under a sunlight bylaw. But that trigger
could obviously be adjusted based on factors such as the size of a
company measured in market capitalization, where, as was true of
DuPont, 5% of the company’s outstanding shares cost billions.
2. What a Sunlight Bylaw Might Have Revealed

Consider what a sunlight bylaw might have revealed in the
activist campaign against DuPont and why Trian might need to sue to
invalidate it.
Trian issued numerous white papers and press releases, but
consider its last white paper before the stockholder vote. It begins
with the disclaimer that “[n]either the Participants nor any of their
affiliates shall be responsible or have any liability for any
misinformation contained in any third party, SEC or other regulatory
filing or other third party report” and “Trian [] disclaims any
obligation to update the data, information or opinions contained in
this presentation.”147 Query whether Trian is attempting to disclaim
any obligation to be accurate in its own SEC filings about its
holdings. Regardless, it plainly disclaims any obligation to update
any information.148
Trian attacks DuPont’s growth as purely cyclical, not driven by
value added by management, and followed the common tactic of
engaging in a highly detailed discussion of executive compensation
under the title: “Poorly Constructed Compensation Programs: High
Annual Payouts Despite Poor Performance.”149
147. TRIAN PARTNERS, DUPONT: A REFERENDUM ON PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (2015), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/30554/000093041
315000509/c80237_ex1.pdf [http://perma.cc/LLD4-DD6P].
148. Id.
149. Id. at 16. Activist hedge funds commonly attack executive compensation. See,
e.g., Liz Hoffman, Activist Funds Put Executive Pay Formulas Under Microscope,
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Although Trian need not disclose its principals’ compensation or its
annual yields, one can compare DuPont’s disclosures to news reports.
According to DuPont’s 2014 Proxy, in 2013, its then-Chairman and
CEO Ellen Kullman earned about $12.5 million while its stock price
increased by about 42%; 150 according to its 2015 Proxy, in 2014,
Kullman earned about $12 million while its stock price increased
16%. 151 According to Forbes—again, the best one can do—in 2013,
Trian’s principal Nelson Peltz earned $430 million while the fund
yielded about 40%;152 in 2014, Peltz earned $170 million while the fund
yielded about 11%.153 In other words, for generating an average yield in
2013 through 2014 that was less than DuPont’s, Peltz earned average
compensation that exceeded DuPont’s CEO’s by over twenty-four
times.
Trian touts the $11.3 billion of assets under its management,154 but
consider what this might mean for Trian’s guaranteed income. Under the
“standard compensation structure . . . hedge fund managers charge
annually 2% of the assets under management plus a performance fee of
20%.” 155 Two percent of $11.3 billion in assets under management
would result in a fixed, annual management fee of about $226 million,
suggesting compensation for its executives not directly tied to
performance that dwarfs that of executive management at DuPont.
Trian also recites its long-term investments in Wendy’s, Tiffany’s,
Heinz, and Family Dollar.156 But this selective recitation of examples is
WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2015, 5:39 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-funds-putexecutive-pay-formulas-under-microscope-1434058799
[http://perma.cc/MXW2EYSN]; Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizzio Ferri & Volkan Muslu, Shareholder Activism and
CEO Pay, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 535 (2011).
150. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 14,
2014).
151. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 23,
2015).
152. Nathan Vardi, The 25 Highest-Earning Hedge Fund Managers and Traders,
FORBES (Feb. 26, 2014, 9:47 AM), http://www.forbes.com/pictures/mdg45eejfh/16nelson-peltz/ [http://perma.cc/E6HJ-7962].
153. Nathan Vardi, The 25 Highest-Earning Hedge Fund Managers and Traders,
FORBES (Feb. 25, 2015, 9:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/pictures/mdg45ehmel/23nelson-peltz/ [http://perma.cc/4G3P-J7F9].
154. TRIAN PARTNERS, supra note 147, at 30.
155. Coffee & Palia, supra note 49, at 48.
156. TRIAN PARTNERS, supra note 147, at 31.
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not a catalogue of its prior holding periods after every intervention, does
not disclose its percentage annual portfolio turnover, and is nothing
close to the detailed information DuPont must report about its assets
annually and update quarterly under the securities laws.
Trian also touts its ownership of about $1.9 billion in DuPont
shares compared to about $20 million in shares owned by
management.157 But that, of course, appears to be only about 17% of
Trian’s assets, and many DuPont directors and executives likely have a
far higher percentage of their wealth tied to DuPont’s future.
To the extent that the discussion here of news reports concerning
Trian is much more general or based on less reliable sources than
Trian’s discussion of DuPont, that is because of the disclosure
asymmetry. The information culled from Trian’s disclosures and news
reports simply hints at the size and direction of what might be gleaned
from disclosures under sunlight bylaws.
Even this superficial review, reveals that Trian’s investment and the
compensation and incentives of its decision-makers likely do not
comport with the incentives assumed by Professors Brav and Bebchuk.
Knowing this, Trian may well have sued to invalidate any sunlight
bylaw.
DuPont should win.
3. DuPont’s Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws
As explained, a sunlight bylaw would have been consistent with the
DGCL. It also would have been consistent with DuPont’s certificate of
incorporation and bylaws.
DuPont’s certificate of incorporation states that subject to the
power of stockholders to make and repeal bylaws, the board has the
power “to make By-laws; and, from time to time, to alter amend or
repeal any By-laws.”158 DuPont’s bylaws specify that a special meeting
requested by stockholders will not be held if the business proposed “is
not a proper subject for stockholder action under applicable law” and
“[b]usiness transacted at all special meetings shall be limited to the

157. Id. at 33.
158. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Restated Certificate of Incorporation 7-8
(May 29, 1997).
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matters stated in the Company’s notice” or stockholder business
proposed in compliance with the bylaws. 159 DuPont’s bylaws require
stockholders to give advanced notice of any such business from 90 to
120 days before the meeting, and any violation prohibits the business
from being considered. 160 Finally, the bylaws confirm that a majority
board vote can adopt, amend, or repeal the bylaws.161 A sunlight bylaw
would be consistent with DuPont’s certificate of incorporation and
bylaws.
4. Validity of the Sunlight Bylaw As Applied
In Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, (“Sotheby’s”), the court upheld the
rights plan designed by Wachtell Lipton with thresholds based on
Schedule 13D filings to protect Sotheby’s from the threat of creeping
control.162 There, Vice Chancellor Parsons applied the Unocal standard
of review and rejected the more stringent standard urged by the
activist,163 but this Article will examine them under the most stringent
standard. That analysis, of course, applies with even greater force under
the Unocal standard.
Chief Justice Strine, while a Vice-Chancellor, interpreted Delaware
Supreme Court precedent governing an incumbent board’s power to
pass bylaws affecting voting rights as requiring the incumbent board to
show: (1) “a legitimate corporate objective served by its decision,” (2)
“that their motivations were proper and not selfish,” (3) “that their
actions were reasonable in relation to their legitimate objective,” and (4)
that their actions “did not preclude the stockholders from exercising
their right to vote or coerce them into voting a particular way.”164 Even
harkening back to the most restrictive view of the board’s ability to pass
bylaws affecting voting rights in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,
does not change the analysis.165 According to Blasius, a board cannot act
159. E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO., BYLAWS art. 1, § 2 (2013).
160. Id. at art. 1, § 8.
161. Id. at art. VII.
162. Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, Nos. 9469–VCP, 9497–VCP, 9508–VCP, 2014
WL 1922029 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014).
163. Id. at *15-17.
164. Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 810-11 (Del. Ch. 2007).
165. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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“for the primary purpose of preventing or impeding an unaffiliated
majority of shareholders from expanding the board and electing a new
majority,” without satisfying the difficult burden of “demonstrating a
compelling justification for such action.”166
A properly drafted and administered sunlight bylaw serves the
legitimate corporate objective of promoting disclosure that would enable
other stockholders and the board to better evaluate activist hedge funds’
incentives and proposals. The fit between means and ends is reasonable
because it requires the disclosure of readily available information, it
cannot be shown to deter a material amount of beneficial activism, it
might lead to more beneficial activism, and it regulates process rather
than dictating an outcome.
The sunlight bylaw enhances the stockholder’s franchise, rather
than detracting from it. It allows other stockholders to evaluate not only
any facts creating potential agency issues for the company’s board and
executive management, but also information relevant to potential
conflicts of interest between the activist hedge fund managers and other
stockholders. Chief Justice Strine has explained why enhancing Section
13(d)’s disclosure requirements would promote better stockholder
decision-making and enhance their electoral rights:
If [Bebchuk’s] argument is there is no reason to fear that hedge
funds or other activist investors can threaten long-term value
because longer-term investors will hold the balance of voting power,
it logically follows that the voting electorate should have up-to-date,
complete information about the economic interests of a hedge fund
holding a large bloc of a corporation’s shares and proposing that the
corporation make business strategy changes it is suggesting.
Precisely how “long” the fund’s investment in the company is and in
what manner the hedge fund is long is relevant information for the
electorate to consider in evaluating the hedge fund’s interest. So is
how “long” the activist is committed to owning its shares. This is
consistent with Bebchuk and his allies’ belief that corporate
managers should fully disclose their interests. When an investor is
seeking to influence corporate strategies, especially by seeking status
as a fiduciary or by using threat of an election campaign to gain
concessions, that investor is taking action that affects all the
company’s investors. If the electorate is to play the role Bebchuk

166.

Id. at 652, 661.
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envisions, he should support requirements to make sure that up-todate, complete information about the proponents’ economic holdings
167
and interests is available.

His analysis applies with equal force to a sunlight bylaw passed and
approved by the elected DuPont board.
The sunlight bylaw would also facilitate decision-making by the
board of directors. Vice Chancellor Laster has explained that “[u]nder
the DGCL, unless a Delaware corporation provides otherwise in its
certificate of incorporation, its existence is perpetual.”168 He concluded
that “[t]he directors’ fiduciary duties therefore require that they
maximize the value of the corporation over the long term for the benefit
of the providers of longterm (i.e., presumptively permanent) capital.”169
Although basing fiduciary duties on a perpetual existence may stir up
some controversy,170 the directors must consider the impact of a strategic
proposal on net present value. In doing so, they are entitled to consider
facts bearing on the implications of strategic proposals for the company
and its stockholders over time frames longer than the average activist’s
investment.171
DuPont could point to substantial additional support in Delaware
case law to argue that its sunlight bylaw was equitable and lawful.
First, the Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that a company
may create the freedom to resist short-term pressures and focus on longterm value. In Williams v. Geier, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld,
under the business judgment rule, a stockholder-approved
recapitalization plan granting ten votes per share to stockholders who
owned as of the record date and one vote per share to their subsequent

167. Strine, supra note 59, at 495-96.
168. J. Travis Laster & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights and Duties of
Blockholder Directors, 70 BUS. LAW. 33, 49 (2015).
169. Id.; see also In re Rural/Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 102 A.3d 205, 253-54,
253 n.28 (Del. Ch. 2014); In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 36-37, 37 n.5
(Del. Ch. 2013).
170. Jack Bodner, Leonard Chazen & Donald Ross, Covington & Burling LLP, Vice
Chancellor Laster and the Long-Term Rule, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Mar. 11, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/03/11/vice-chancello
r-laster-and-the-long-term-rule/ [http://perma.cc/5R77-R646].
171. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
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transferees until they had held the stock for three years.172 The Delaware
Supreme Court recognized that the board recommended the plan to,
among other things, “[m]aintain ability to maximize long-term value,”
“[p]rotect long-term commitment to continued growth and investment,”
and “[r]educe [the] level of exposure to raiders seeking to capitalize on
corporate vulnerability due to short-term business cycles.” 173 Even
though the recapitalization would have “the effect of strengthening” a
family’s long-standing and majority interest in the company, the court
found there was no evidence the board was interested, entrenching itself,
or controlled by the family, and therefore the board’s recommendation
passed muster under the business judgment rule.174
Second, the Delaware Supreme Court has recognized the need for
the board to have an orderly process before a stockholder vote that
ensures the quality of director nominees. In Stroud v. Grace, the
Delaware Supreme Court upheld, under the business judgment rule,
stockholder-approved changes to the certificate of incorporation and
bylaws regulating the disclosures by and qualifications of nominees for
board positions.175 The bylaw required stockholders proposing a board
candidate to include in the notice of nomination submitted no less than
fourteen days before the stockholder vote a statement of how the
nominee qualified and empowered the board to prevent unqualified
nominees from running.176 The Delaware Supreme Court held that it did
not present such a severe, hypothetical risk of injury to the stockholders’
franchise it had to be stricken down. 177 In the bylaw, the incumbent
board reserved the discretion to make the subjective judgment about
whether certain candidates “had substantial experience in line . . .
positions in the management of substantial business enterprises or
substantial private institutions.”178 But the Stroud court emphasized “our
entire legal system makes liberal use of the word ‘substantial’ and its
derivatives as a qualifier in a broad range of rules and statutes.”179
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1370, 1382-84 (Del. 1996).
Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1378-79.
Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 94-96 (Del. 1992).
Id. at 80.
Id. at 94-96.
Id. at 92-95 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 93-94.
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Third, Delaware courts have recognized the importance of
improving board and stockholder decision-making. In Kidsco Inc. v.
Dinsmore, the company had entered a stock-for-stock merger
agreement. 180 Days before the stockholder vote on the merger, a
competing bidder disclosed a tender offer and an intent to solicit
stockholders to demand a special meeting to replace the current board
with members who would dismantle the rights plan. 181 The company
negotiated with the original merger partner to increase consideration, but
time was short, and the company therefore passed a bylaw amendment
enlarging the time in which to respond to any stockholder demand for a
proxy vote on replacing the directors by about twenty-five days.182 The
Delaware Chancery Court upheld the bylaw amendment and rejected an
entrenchment argument because the bylaw would only leave the board
in place for an additional twenty-five days, would enable the board to
negotiate the highest and best offer in the stock-for-stock merger and
consider alternatives, and would not perpetuate the board members’
positions in office for an extended period. 183 The Delaware Supreme
Court affirmed in an unpublished opinion.184
The sunlight bylaw would promote the goal of providing
information to the board and other stockholders so they have the option
of considering the impact of the strategic proposal over time, would
allow the strategic proposal or nominee to go to a stockholder vote
without delay if the activist complied, and would only prevent particular
issues or nominees from being considered at the vote if violated. And,
although the sunlight bylaw would reference materiality, the word
material is as common as the word substantial in our legal system, and
the sunlight bylaw contains many other, more objective measures of
compliance. Cases striking down bylaws for entrenching incumbents are
far afield.185
180. Kidsco v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 486 (Del. Ch. 1995), aff’d and remanded,
670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995).
181. Id. at 487.
182. Id. at 488-89.
183. Id. at 493, 495-96.
184. Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995).
185. See, e.g., Black v. Hollinger Int’l Inc., 872 A.2d 559, 561, 563 (Del. 2005)
(finding invalid bylaws proposed by the CEO after being confronted with “findings of
improper self-dealing and material misrepresentations” in public filings; bylaws would
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Trian could argue that by deferring their proposals or nominees, the
board was effectively denying them, but that would be a
mischaracterization. Sunlight bylaws are agnostic to the content of the
investor proposal. To obtain a stockholder vote, the investor need only
make the required disclosures. If the activist made an otherwise
appropriate disclosure slightly late and with a good excuse, the company
could approve it and there might be no delay or it might well be as short
as the twenty-five days in Kidsco. If the board acted with alacrity and
sensitivity to its obligations to the stockholders and to ensure a process
that enables orderly consideration of strategic proposals and nominees, it
would enhance the other stockholders’ rights.
Trian might argue that the remedy is akin to that for violating an
advanced notice bylaw and the same constraints should apply. Advance
notice bylaws, which are common, usually require prospective nominees
for the board and stockholders proposing business or governance
changes to submit certain information at least sixty days before the
stockholders’ meeting and vote. 186 “Advance notice bylaws are often
construed and frequently upheld as valid,” and “function to permit
orderly meetings and election contests and to provide fair warning to the
corporation so that it may have sufficient time to respond to shareholder

have empowered the CEO to “unilaterally to block any material sale of assets, to
prevent the signing of a merger agreement,” and to block a shareholder rights plan
designed to thwart the CEO’s self-dealing transaction); MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.,
813 A.2d 1118, 1126, 1132 (Del. 2003) (incumbent board member testified and the
Chancery Court found that the director defendants “amended the bylaws to provide for
a board of seven and appointed two additional members of the Board for the primary
purpose of diminishing the influence of” two individuals standing election for positions
as directors); Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 438-39 (Del. 1971)
(after learning of potential proxy fight, the incumbent board refused to provide dissident
stockholders with a list of stockholders and accelerated the date of the annual meeting
by a month); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 658 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(finding “the evidence is powerful, indeed compelling, that the board was chiefly
motivated” to expand the board by adding friendly directors “to forestall or preclude the
possibility that a majority of shareholders might place on the . . . board eight new
members sympathetic to” a recapitalization plan that was the subject of “vital policy
differences”).
186. R. Franklink Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 7.9 (3d ed. 2016 Supp.).
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nominations.” 187 While they are stricken down when they “unduly
restrict the stockholder franchise or are applied inequitably,”188 sunlight
bylaws promote rather than restrict the franchise, and boards can
exercise care when determining whether to approve belated disclosures
under the sunlight bylaw and to permit the issue to go to a stockholder’s
vote.
The activists might calculate that if they published sunlight bylaw
disclosures months or years into their campaign but shortly before the
stockholder vote, then the board would be compelled to put their
proposal or nominees on the ballot. Such belated disclosure, however,
would defeat the point of the sunlight bylaw. The Delaware Chancery
Court found that a board properly refused to waive the requirements of
an advance notice bylaw where it found “it would be unfair to the
remaining stockholders” and “if it did issue a waiver, the bylaws would
lack meaning.” 189 Waiving belated compliance with a sunlight bylaw
could also be unfair to other stockholders who assumed compliance was
required and could defeat the purpose of requiring disclosures
sufficiently in advance of the vote for other stockholders to consider the
information, but the board’s decision should and would hinge on actual
facts in a specific case.
5. A Rights Plan
The DuPont board might still need to enact a rights plan, although
Trian’s campaign does not appear to have been based on the sort of
vote-buying found in Sotheby’s. The pace of the campaign and the
increase in ownership by a lead activist and its allies might force the
company to do so. And, of course, the rights plan could use Schedule
13D filings and any information from sunlight bylaw disclosures to
determine the thresholds.
But in such a case, any analysis of the validity of the sunlight bylaw
and the rights plan should distinguish between the two instruments. The

187. Openwave Sys. Inc. v. Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, Ltd., 924
A.2d 228, 238-39 (Del. Ch. 2007); see also AB Value Partners, LP v. Kreisler Mfg.
Corp., No. 10434-VCP, 2014 WL 7150465, at * 3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2014).
188. Openwave Sys., 924 A.2d at 239.
189. Id. at 242.
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sunlight bylaw encourages disclosure and a better process for board and
stockholder decision-making. It is not a defensive or protective device
and should not be confused with one, even though it can provide
information to the company before it adopts a rights plan and inform
how it tailors the rights plan. Depending on the pace of the activist share
purchases, their ownership levels, and the content of their strategic
proposal, a rights plan with thresholds sensitive to sunlight bylaw
disclosures may be necessary and equitable.
And any additional disclosure combined with a more tailored rights
plan would allow the Delaware courts to draw finer distinctions and
plumb more deeply into what happened in the activist campaign in any
litigation. Lawyers draft initial discovery requests based on publiclyavailable information and information from their clients. Expedited
discovery and trials are common in Delaware. Absent any reporting
under a sunlight bylaw, the identities of at least some wolf pack
members lurking below Section 13(d)’s reporting thresholds will
probably remain unknown at least until the depositions of those working
for the lead activist, after completing the bulk of document discovery,
and too late to depose any employees or representatives of those
members. Time will likely not permit connecting all the dots. The
financial interests and incentives of the entire wolf pack may never be
uncovered in discovery or presented to any court. Asymmetrical public
disclosure thus has a path-dependent effect on the scope of litigation
discovery and the record before the court.
In the long run, if compliance with sunlight bylaws became routine,
developing this information in the public sphere would then lead to
more complete records for deciding expedited cases in Delaware.
VI. RECIPROCAL DISCLOSURES AS A FIRST STEP
“The [nuclear] bomb may have ended [World War II] but radar
won it.”190 So said many radar researchers and workers in August 1945,
when the news of the atomic bomb upstaged a planned Time magazine
cover story about the MIT Radiation Laboratory’s part in the war

190. LOUIS BROWN, A RADAR HISTORY
MILITARY IMPERATIVES, at x (1999).
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effort.191 That concept is not lost on activist hedge funds, which have
used the information public companies are rightly required to disclose as
a weapon while operating in the shadows, without disclosure. The
activist hedge funds would likely not give up that advantage readily, and
they could create two principal risks for boards that implement sunlight
bylaws—litigation risks and the risk of a proxy fight.
Although, as explained, sunlight bylaws should pass muster under
Delaware law, they would likely precipitate litigation. In a recent
decision, the Delaware Chancery Court refused to dismiss a claim under
Unocal for the passage of bylaws that required the disclosure of options
and short interests by shareholders requesting special meetings,
submitting nominations, or submitting strategic proposals and vesting
substantial authority in the chair at the meeting.192 The court reasoned
that “the reasonableness of a defensive response whose munitions
include the ability to foreclose the use of special meetings to hold
elections requires an explanation not evident on the face of these
pleadings.”193 The validity of sunlight bylaws as-applied would therefore
likely turn on specific facts in the context of an as-applied challenge,
and passing them would create litigation risk.
Sunlight bylaws might also precipitate a proxy fight and alienate
important institutional stockholders. Professor Allaire and Dauphin
found that the most popular hedge fund tactic was to publicly criticize
companies, which is successful 59% of the time, and that although
activist hedge funds more rarely threaten or launch proxy contests,
doing so leads to success over 80% of the time.194 In part, that is because
76% of institutional investors have favorable views of shareholder
activism, and 84% believe it adds value.195
Certain institutional investors also opposed Wachtell Lipton’s
proposal to expand reporting requirements under Section 13(d), citing a
fear that accelerated, public reporting requirements would deter
191. Id.
192. In re Ebix, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 8526–VCN, 2016 WL 208402, at *7,
*20 (Del. Ch. Jan. 15, 2016).
193. Id. at *20.
194. ALLAIRE & DAUPHIN, supra note 68, at 8.
195. Yvan Allaire, The Case For and Against Activist Hedge Funds 5 (May 28,
2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2613154 [http://perma.cc/6B
TK-5GWL].
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beneficial activism. 196 ISS—one of the two principal proxy advisory
firms—has also opposed advanced notice bylaws that would require
enhanced disclosures surrounding director nominees’ outside sources of
compensation for service as a director.197
Support for activist hedge funds means that that—rightly or
wrongly—any board that passed a sunlight bylaw might well face a
revolt at the next proxy vote. Consider then reciprocal disclosures as an
alternative, which should be more palatable to institutional investors
wary about deterring beneficial activism.
Boards, institutional investors, and proxy advisory firms should
request that activist hedge funds making strategic proposals also
disclose the information required to be disclosed under sunlight bylaws
voluntarily. Much like Schedule 13F disclosures, public companies
could entertain requests for time-limited confidential treatment or any
other lawful form of confidential treatment. Simply delaying the
disclosure until some twenty days after the activist hedge fund publicly
announces its strategic proposal would allow it to reap the benefits of
the short-term abnormal returns that some theorize as necessary to
incentivize beneficial activism.
The reciprocal disclosures would focus on issues of acute interest to
institutional stockholders. Institutional investors have recently signaled
that they—unsurprisingly—wish to make the best decision on the merits
to promote long-term value. In 2015, Blackrock’s CEO Laurence Fink
wrote about “the importance of taking a long-term approach to creating
value” while emphasizing that “some activist investors take a long-term
view and have pushed companies and their boards to make productive
changes.”198 Vanguard’s CEO wrote that, as the holder of about 5% of
every publicly-traded stock in the United States, Vanguard believes that
196. Letter from Andrew N. Vollmer, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP,
on behalf of certain members of the Managed Funds Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec’y, SEC (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-624/4624-5.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/B89E-MRVT].
197. JASON D. SCHLOETZER, THE CONFERENCE BD., DIRECTOR NOTES: ACTIVIST
HEDGE FUNDS, “GOLDEN LEASH” SPECIAL COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS, AND
ADVANCE NOTICE BYLAWS 10 (2015), http://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cf
m?filename=TCB-DNV7N5-Activist-Hedge-Funds1.pdf&type=subsite [http://perma.cc
/TWF4-ULME].
198. Letter from Laurence D. Fink, supra note 44, at 1.
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boards have an obligation to engage with and listen to activist hedge
funds but “it doesn’t mean that the board should capitulate to things that
aren’t in the company’s long-term interest.” He also wrote that
Vanguard is focused on “[s]hareholder voting rights that are consistent
with economic interests” and “[s]ensible compensation tied to
performance.”199 Queries to activist hedge funds about their investment
horizons, portfolio turnover, the percentage of their assets the
investment represents, communications with their supporters, the
correlation between their economic interests and voting rights, and fund
manager’s compensation go to the heart of these issues. As explained,
recent empirical evidence suggests that activist hedge funds that acquire
a higher stake generate higher returns, presumably because the market
cares about their incentives, or better incentives lead to better strategic
proposals. All of the other facts bearing on their incentives identified in
the proposed sunlight bylaws should also influence votes.
And a recent survey of institutional investors showed that 29%
have holding periods of six months to two years while 71% have
holding periods of over two years.200 88% of these institutional investors
also perceive excessive executive compensation or inadequate corporate
governance as somewhat to very important triggers for hedge fund
activism, although, as explained, interventions to address those issues
are seldom followed by significant improvements in operating
performance or share price. 201 Again, requiring activists to disclose
information bearing on their incentives and investment horizons speaks
directly to the issues on which the institutional investors are focused and
the areas in which their interests and the activists’ may diverge.
Reciprocal disclosures could be negotiated in a way that would
pose no risk of reducing beneficial activism. When the activist first
199. F. William McNabb III, Chairman and CEO, Vanguard, Getting to Know You:
The Case for Significant Shareholder Engagement, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 24, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/24/
getting-to-know-you-the-case-for-significant-shareholder-engagement/ [http://perma.cc/
3MN3-QPWA].
200. Joseph A. McCahery, Zacharias Sautner & Laura T. Starks, Behind the Scenes:
The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors, J. FINANCE
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 6), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=15
71046 [http://perma.cc/TF23-XEH4].
201. Id. at 20.
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makes a strategic proposal to the company—particularly if it owns very
little stock—the board could agree to treat any reciprocal disclosure
confidentially for a period of time and the activist could then reap the
full benefit of the short-term increase in share price in the forty days
surrounding the filing of its Schedule 13D. Institutional investors, if not
already requiring the disclosure of this information from activist hedge
funds, should also do so.
Public companies should carefully reserve the right to publish any
questions that the activist hedge fund refuses to answer, any questions
that it will answer but not permit disclosure of its answer, or its refusal
to update answers as the campaign unfolds. If the activist hedge fund
refuses to disclose this information or refuses to permit its public
disclosure sufficiently before a stockholder vote, it provides a good
indication it is unwilling to operate in the sun. That refusal, which the
board could and should publicize if a proxy fight occurs, would speak
volumes.
According to political myth, when President Lyndon B. Johnson
was running a tough campaign against a well-respected opponent for
office in Texas, he instructed his campaign to spread the rumor that his
opponent had sex with pigs. When one of his advisors complained that
the story was false and no one would believe it, President Johnson said
“I know, but let’s make [him] deny it.”202 Activist hedge fund campaigns
are no less hard fought than political elections, and hedge funds often
use harsh rhetoric to negatively characterize the voluminous information
contained in public companies’ disclosures; it is a difficult task indeed
for the public company to respond in a way that does not sound
defensive; and any response by the public company only provides half
of the necessary information. Information from the public company
alone can seldom—if ever—answer whether the activist hedge fund
manager is a better agent for long-term stockholders.
Public companies must at least ask the questions that would expose
any inconsistencies, obscured by current disclosure laws, between what
an activist hedge fund does and what it says. For example, activist hedge
funds routinely grand-stand about excessive executive compensation at
public companies, but, according to news reports, appear to award their
202. HUNTER S. THOMPSON, FEAR
(1973).
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managers extremely lucrative compensation packages despite, at best,
modest returns. At the very least, in response to a request for reciprocal
disclosure, the activists should be forced to assert that their own
compensation schemes are the finance equivalent of the secret formula
for Coca-Cola and cannot be disclosed. If they do so, it will be more
difficult for them to reasonably dismiss the argument that public
companies need pay their executives well to attract and retain them.
Reciprocal disclosures could also lay the groundwork for sunlight
bylaws. The information disclosed by activist hedge funds under them
could serve useful to academics, although keep in mind that activist
hedge funds will likely avoid disclosing the most damaging information,
so some limits to current disclosures will persist. Reciprocal disclosures
will also allow public companies, their lawyers, and their investment
bankers to develop a body of experience with crafting such requests
before enshrining reporting requirements in bylaws that are more
difficult to pass, amend, and repeal.
CONCLUSION
Each activist hedge fund, each campaign, each strategic proposal,
and each company is complex and unique. But the limits of current
disclosure laws mean that, although much is publicly disclosed about the
company, little is disclosed about the hedge funds. Those limits prevent
boards from evaluating activists’ proposals and incentives on a case-bycase basis with the required speed. Wearing blinders, the board is thus
forced to choose among fighting, capitulating, or something in between.
Making such decisions on materially incomplete information advances
no one’s interests but those of the activists. If boards or stockholders
decide to pass sunlight bylaws or request reciprocal disclosures so that
those who seek to wield power have a fraction of the disclosure
obligations imposed on those with responsibility, then those judgments
should be respected.

